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• “The problem” of the Saharawi people
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“The problem” of the saharawi people

When, after almost a century of colonisation, Spain was drawing up a referendum on self-determination for Western Sahara (1975), King Hassan II, aware that its success would imply independence, proceeded to occupy the area by means of the “Green March”, thereby violating international law while causing exodus of the Saharawi population under the bombs dropped by Moroccan planes and their refuge in what was purportedly a provisional place of shelter, the Tindouf camps (Algeria).

Franco’s death throes and uncertainty regarding its immediate future led the Spanish Government to ignore its international obligations (which demanded that it place administration of the area in the hands of the Saharawi people or the UN), instead handing the power to Morocco and Mauritania (Madrid tripartite agreements), despite the fact that, as had clearly been established days previously by the International Court of Justice, these States had no right whatsoever to sovereignty over the area, meaning that the conflict should have been solved by means of a referendum on self-determination in which the Saharawi people and they alone would participate.

The signing of these agreements obliged the POLISARIO Front, recognised by the UN as the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharawi people, to launch a national liberation war finally obtaining Mauritania’s withdrawal from the conflict (1979) and recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and obliging Morocco to negotiate a peace plan, given the drain on its economy implied by the continued warring.

The cease-fire took effect on 6 September 1991, starting point for application of the Settlement Plan negotiated by Morocco and the POLISARIO Front (1988) which was supposed to conclude with a referendum on self-determination within a period of six months. The Plan established that only two options would be proposed to the population: independence or integration with Morocco, and precisely limited the census of people who could participate in the referendum.

However, the victory in the first round of the Algerian elections of a fundamentalist party (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) and the civil war unleashed by this occurrence (1992) led the Moroccan Government to reconsider its stance on the referendum in the hope that the internal conflict would oblige Algeria to withdraw its support of the Saharawi people, which fortunately never happened.

From then on, the Moroccan Government used the peace plan, not to achieve its theoretical objective, a referendum, but to indefinitely postpone it. However, despite the never-ending obstacles rolled out by Morocco to stall the voter identification process, the UN finally compiled a rigorous census for the referendum, the moment when Morocco decided to abandon the peace plan (2000), accusing the UN of partiality and revealing its true intentions in the doing.

Abandoning the peace plan, Kofi Annan turned to James Baker to find an “acceptable solution for both sides”, on the fringes of international law. The “Baker Plan” (2003), envisaging that, following five years of limited autonomy governed by the Saharawi people, a referendum on self-determination would be held to decide the future of the area, with participation of the Saharawis listed on the UN census... plus the Moroccan settlers, who even then tripled the Saharawis, was approved by the POLISARIO Front but rejected by Morocco. The reason for this surprising rejection was explained by the Special Representative of the UN General Secretary: the Moroccan Government didn’t trust the way its own citizens (the settlers) would vote.

The Security Council has the authority to impose a specific solution, and the Settlement Plan in addition to having been freely negotiated by the parties, had its approval, but the veto of France, unconditional ally of Morocco, continues to prevent this solution, meaning that the peace process remains in a deadlock.

After 35 years of struggling for peace, the SADR is recognised by over 80 States and is full right member of the African Union. The United Nations has openly stated that the conflict must be solved by the Saharawi people exercising its right to free determination. Despite this, looking the other way, the EU, which claims to give lessons on democracy to the world, is illegally negotiating with Morocco regarding exploitation of the natural resources in the area (fishing, phosphates, etc.).

Meanwhile, the Saharawi people remains broken into two parts split between those who suffer brutal military occupation and repression in their land, and those who have, since their flight, survived thanks to humanitarian aid in the Algerian refugee camps.

The film El problema seeks to shake the dust of time and interested opinions from the true origin of the conflict and provide the spectator with the main keys for making his or her own opinion on the matter.

Juan Soroeta
Professor of International Public Law
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)

• © 2010 8th Human Rights Film Festival